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Abstract. In quantum networking, repeater hijacking menaces the security and
utility of quantum applications. To deal with this problem, it is important to take
a measure of the impact of quantum repeater hijacking. First, we quantify the work
of each quantum repeater with regards to each quantum communication. Based on
this, we show the costs for repeater hijacking detection using distributed quantum
state tomography and the amount of work loss and rerouting penalties caused by
hijacking. This quantitive evaluation covers both purification-entanglement swapping
and quantum error correction repeater networks. Naive implementation of the checks
necessary for correct network operation can be subverted by a single hijacker to bring
down an entire network. Fortunately, the simple fix of randomly assigned testing can
prevent such an attack.
Keywords: Route hijacking, Quantum repeater, Quantum network
1. Introduction
Large scale quantum repeater networks will be required for world-wide quantum
communication between arbitrary nodes [1, 2]. The main functionality of the quantum
network is to create Bell pairs between two chosen nodes [3, 4]. Such Bell pairs enable,
for example, provably secure shared keys for classical encrypted communication [5],
distributed quantum computation [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], and various kinds of physical
experiments [13, 14, 15, 16].
Implementations of quantum repeaters are classified into three generations by
Muralidharan et al. [17]. (1) The first generation employs entanglement purification
[3, 18, 19, 20]. To make forward progress, these schemes depend on receiving
messages indicating the success or failure of entangled state creation, and are known
as acknowledged entanglement control (AEC) [21, 22] or heralded entanglement
generation (HEG) [17, 23].
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This generation achieves high fidelity by entanglement purification, which requires
bidirectional classical communication (a two-way entanglement purification protocol,
or 2-EPP) and achieves Bell pairs between non-neighboring nodes by entanglement
swapping between neighboring links [24]. To tolerate decoherence, this generation
requires entanglement purification between remote nodes, therefore the cost increases as
a polynomial multiple of the number of hops. (2) The second generation creates encoded
Bell pairs between each pair of neighboring nodes and executes entanglement swapping
between encoded Bell pairs to create encoded Bell pairs between two arbitrary nodes [25,
26, 27]. Encoded Bell pairs over each link are created by using transversal teleportation-
CNOT gates, which consume physical Bell pairs and require only unidirectional classical
communication (a one-way entanglement purification protocol, 1-EPP). At the link level
this generation is employed only when the photonic qubit’s error rate is low, because
the benefit of 1-EPP is ruined if physical level bidirectional entanglement purification
(2-EPP) is required. Fowler et al.’s Bell pair creation for the surface code is also in
this generation [28]. Their method creates a surface code lattice which spans all
the repeater nodes in a path between the two end nodes by measuring stabilizers
separated in neighboring nodes by consuming Bell pairs. Next, the portions of the
lattice held by repeater nodes are measured out and a Bell pair encoded on the surface
code is left between the two end nodes. (3) The third generation directly sends pulses
on which a quantum state is encoded by quantum error correction, which requires
unidirectional classical communication (1-EPP) [29, 30]. This generation requires
very high reception probability to allow direct transmission of states. We call (1) the
entanglement swapping (ES) model and call (2) and (3) quantum error correction (QEC)
models.
Any generation and model assumes that every node functions properly, but in
the real world, malfunctions and hijacking of nodes are problematic. A world-wide
internetwork will have too many nodes to avoid such problems. Malfunctions can
be detected by self-check of every node, however, hijackings generally accompany
concealment, hence it is difficult to find them by self-checks alone.
Repeater hijacking is one of the highest priority problems in network operation,
due to its possible impact on the stability of the network itself. In contrast, use of
vulnerable applications is a lesser concern from the point of view of network operations,
because it affects the integrity of the nodes using the quantum applications rather than
the operational integrity of the network.
In classical networks, there exist many types of attacks and taxonomies of those
have been created. As an example from the perspective of the attack target, in a
denial of service (DoS) attack, the attacker infringes on the availability of information
services. An attacker can also listen in on a communications session. If the listening
is passive, the attacker is referred to as an eavesdropper. An attacker that modifies
messages between the sender and receiver is known as a man in the middle. In this way,
the eavesdropper intercepts messages exchanged between the two victims and replaces
them with other messages, while letting the victims think that they are directly talking
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to each other through a private connection. A model that has been used in Internet of
Things research led to our model based on the issues of confidentiality (whether data
has been disclosed), integrity (whether data has bee modified), and availability [31].
Classically, the impact of failures of nodes or attacks on nodes, especially distributed
denial of service attacks, has been analyzed [32, 33, 34, 35]. Because attacks that prevent
proper use of some nodes can be tolerated by dynamic routing, the robustness of the
network against failures and attacks depends on the structure of the network. In earlier
work, we proposed a taxonomy of the physical attacks on individual repeater nodes [31].
For the first step of quantification of those attacks, in this paper we focus on the impact
of attacks on quantum repeaters.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm to detect hijacked nodes, similar to quantum
key distribution (QKD), utilizing a state analysis method such as quantum state
tomography [36]. By consuming a portion of the created Bell pairs for state analysis and
adding some classical communication, we can find abnormal Bell pairs, whether caused
by changes to the noise level, hardware or software failures, or attacks. By doing this
we can detect man in the middle attacks on the quantum repeater network, as described
in Sec. 4.1. Next we analyze the impact of hijacking on the performance of the overall
network.
To discuss the margin of network capacity and the cost for hijacking detection,
we take notice of the frequency of state analysis for network maintenance. The state
analysis interval is closely allied to the stability and integrity of the quantum repeater
network. As the total work approaches the network capacity, queueing delays grow
quickly [37]. Therefore, a network is always designed with a certain amount of “slack”
capacity, to reduce queueing delays and the probability of connection failure due to
insufficient capacity as the work varies over time. Fig. 1 qualitatively shows the different
uses of network bandwidth, and how they vary over time. These uses will be detailed in
Sec. 2.4 To quantify this discussion, we evaluate the number of entanglement attempts
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Figure 1. Network slack S over time. We evaluated the unavoidable operating costs
in each phase (Phase 1. Network launching, Phase 2. Normal operation, Phase
3. Response to the detection of repeater hijacking, and Phase 4. Back to normal
operation.). We show details of this diagram in following sections.
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(quantum optical pulses, e.g. single photons) required for tomography between nonlocal
nearest neighbor repeaters. We expand this element to include the costs for hijacking
detection on ES model and QEC model repeater networks.
Sec. 2 shows the components of a quantum repeater network and tomography. In
Sec. 3, we quantify the effects of repeater hijacking. In Sec. 4, we quantify the work of
tomography for hijacking detection and discuss the occurrence of work shedding. Sec. 5
shows how a single hijacker can leverage its position in the network to dramatically
expand an attack and bring down an entire network by framing other repeaters, leading
network administrators to conclude that an entire set of repeaters has been hijacked
and causing them to isolate enough nodes to partition the network. It then proposes
a solution. Sec. 6 describes the process of network operation and recovery from hijack
detection. Sec. 7 summarizes our results and discusses remaining problems.
2. Quantum repeater networks
Before discussing the effect of repeater hijacking, we show the basic organization of
a quantum repeater network with several active connections and the isolation of a
hijacking repeater in Fig. 2. Each node corresponds to a quantum repeater and each
Figure 2. The conceptual view of a quantum repeater network. In this diagram,
links denote optical fiber and nodes denote quantum repeaters serving as Routers,
Repeaters, and End Nodes. After detection of the hijacking of Router k, the network
isolates k and the connections passing through k are rerouted.
link corresponds to a channel such as optical fiber. When the network detects repeater
hijacking, the corresponding repeater is isolated from the network and connections adopt
newly recalculated shortest paths [38].
We show the definition of variables for this paper in Table 1.
2.1. Quantum repeater
A quantum repeater is a device for quantum communication capable of local quantum
operations and conservation of quantum information. Quantum repeaters perform
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Table 1. The correspondence table of variables.
W Work of the entire network. Work denotes total number of attempts
to share Bell pairs for teleportation per second [38].
Wk, W
′(W ′′) Work of repeater k, work including rerouting penalty.
H Amount of work to create end-to-end Bell pair.
D Data (packet) rate of communication, in Bell pairs per second.
h # hops between two nodes in a communication session.
L Amount of work loss.
F, F ′, F ′′ Initial, purified, twice purified fidelity.
E(F ) Expected number of fidelity F base Bell pairs consumed to build one
final Bell pair.
P1(2) Success probability of round 1 (2) of purification.
M Maintenance state analysis cost, in Bell pairs.
C Total network capacity, in Bell pairs per second.
R Maintenance rate, in Bell pairs per second.
S, S ′, S ′′ The slack of network at each time point.
quantum communications using shared Bell pairs between target repeaters. The
implementation model of a repeater is classified according to the Bell pair sharing
method, as discussed in Sec. 1. A repeater’s four main responsibilities are: 1. link-level
entanglement creation; 2. connection of quantum states for multi-hop communication;
3. management of errors; and 4. participating in the management of the network.
In this paper, we distinguish the types of quantum repeaters based on their
connectivity. A Router is connected to three or more links. A Repeater has exactly
two external links, so that it is useful in a line only. An End node has one link and is
connected to a network constructed of Routers and Repeaters. Our investigation focuses
on Repeater and Router hijacking, because hijacking of an End node allows the hijacker
to report any results to the application, up to and including completely forging the
existence of the quantum network itself. (See Sec. 3.1). End nodes also cannot spread
malicious effects to surrounding networks.
In a quantum repeater network, connections are multiplexed [39]. Each repeater
may be used as the start, end and relay point of multiple quantum communication
sessions simultaneously.
2.2. Quantum state analysis
Quantum tomography is a conventional method for estimating the actual quantum states
ρreality generated by a physical apparatus. For the purposes of this paper, any state
analysis technique will do, but for concreteness we present our analysis in terms of
tomography. As shown in Fig. 3, the density matrix ρideal cannot exist in reality, since
errors occur in any physical apparatus. Utilizing quantum tomography, a large number
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of measurements of ρreality give us the fidelity between ρideal and ρreconstructed. This
Figure 3. The process of tomography. This figure is shared from [40].
scheme can be applied to confirming the operational fidelity of an optical fiber and
repeater setup, end-to-end, as well as to the detection of repeater hijacking.
2.2.1. Quantum key distribution QKD has the ability to detect eavesdroppers [41]. For
a noisy channel, information reconciliation to detect errors and privacy amplification to
reduce the amount of information divulged by information reconciliation are proposed,
at the cost of reducing the generated secret key size [42, 43]. Acting as a simplified form
of state analysis, QKD can find evidence of eavesdroppers operating on the quantum
states. However, the simplest form assumes that the hijacker is measuring or completely
entangling with every quantum state. If the hijacker is more sophisticated and attacks
fewer states or entangles only weakly, the effects are more subtle and require more
careful checks to detect.
If our only goal is to prove a Bell inequality violation, the CHSH game is good
enough and requires fewer quantum resources than tomography [44, 45, 46]. Of course,
quantum tomography can more thoroughy evaluate the quantum channel state while
proving a Bell inequality violation. From the point of view of network management,
evaluation of the state created by the channel is an important, fundamental task, to
which quantum tomography is well suited. Rather than add a second protocol for the
narrow purpose of looking for hijacked repeaters, it makes sense to combine the two
tasks, so we propose the adoption of quantum tomography for hijack analysis as well.
2.2.2. Distributed style tomography To use tomography on a repeater network, we have
suggested a distributed quantum state tomography protocol using TCP/IP networks to
exchange the classical information about measurement bases and results, and the output
of the tomographic calculations [40]. In that protocol, we analyze tomography between
remotely located repeaters using Bell pairs that have been purified twice. Against
Werner states ρ with fidelity F ,
ρ = F |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ 1− F
3
(|Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ |Ψ−〉〈Φ−|) , (1)
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Table 2. The procedure for checking for the presence of a hijacked repeater.
# Steps Master repeater (Node 1) Slave repeater (Node 2)
Prep 1. Sharing initial Bell pairs with fidelity F .
Prep 2. Performing two round purification to create final Bell pairs.
1. Select Bell pairs for tomography using synchronized, secure
pseudo random number generators at each end.
.
2. Choose measurement basis using local pure random selector,
receive pulse and measure qubit.
3. M: Receive basis and result from Node 2. S: Send basis and result to Node 1.
Branch: Pulse received on both sides? (S:wait)
Yes: →Recalculate d.m. and Fidelity.
No: →Back to Step 1.
Branch: Is fidelity over the threshold?
Yes: →Send d.m. to Node 2. S: Receive d.m. from Node 1.
No: →Back to Step 1.
Finish. Terminate tomography, move link to production use.
as input states, the second round of purification [47, 48] gives us a greater boost in
fidelity than the first round [2]. The use of many rounds of purification increases the
number of Bell pairs consumed, raising the required number of entanglement attempts
exponentially. To keep the analysis straightforward, we assume without loss of generality
the use of two rounds. We give a brief summary of our protocol in Table 2. Like QKD,
not only must the choice of Bell basis for measurement be random, but which Bell pairs
in the sequence of generated states are allocated to tomography must appear random; if
e.g. every tenth Bell pair is used for hijacker detection, she will simply avoid hijacking
those states. Doing the selection purely randomly and independently at each node will
be very inefficient; the two nodes will choose the same pairs with only probability P 2.
Instead, operation of this detection process will proceed using pseudorandom selection
of states, which requires properly synchronized, cryptographically secure pseudorandom
number generators between each pair of repeaters performing hijack monitoring. The
setup of this generation process is beyond the scope of this paper.
The ability of tomography to distinguish the presence of malicious activity from
noise depends on the state of the Bell pairs can that be generated. Operational networks
are expected to make extensive use of purification. We expect that purification will be
conducted in pairs of rounds, first suppressing X errors, then Z errors. Fig. 4 shows
the fidelity after one round (F ′) and two rounds (F ′′) of purification. Beginning with
Werner states, the first round of purification shuffles X errors into Z error terms, with
minimal improvement to fidelity. The second round of purification then produces a
large improvement in fidelity. Detection of malicious activity depends on our ability
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Figure 4. The expected of # of Bell pairs E(F ) and purified fidelities for one round
(F ′) and two rounds (F ′′) of purification, as a function of the initial fidelity F . Here,
local operation and measurement are considered perfect.
to demonstrate violation of the CHSH inequality. Fig. 5 shows the expected CHSH
measure with the initial Werner states (S), after one round of purification (S ′), and
after two rounds (S ′′). Interestingly, although the fidelity increase after one round of
purification is small, the asymmetric error terms produce a much larger gap in the S
value. Therefore, two rounds of purification are desirable for Bell pairs destined for
application use, but one round is preferred for Bell inequality violation. For further
details on the behavior of purification and CHSH, see Appendix A.
2.3. Network administrator
To discuss the identification of hijacking repeater, we assume the existence of a central
network administrator who has his own trustworthy nodes and collects all end to end
tomography results. When hijacked node is specified, the administrator promptly
isolates the involved node and delivers updated network routing tables that do not
use the isolated node.
2.4. Phases of network operation
In this research, we classify the phases of network operation as follows.
Phase 1. Network bootstrapping. At the start of network operations, we need to
initialize network components. To check the condition of quantum repeaters and links,
some types of tomography (which are explained in Sec. 4.2) are utilized. Almost the
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Figure 5. The CHSH measure S as a function of the initial fidelity F . The lower
curve denotes the measure of initial Bell pairs. The upper (dashed) curve denotes the
measure of twice (once)-purified Bell pair S′′ (S′). The upper and lower horizontal
dashed line denote Tsirelson’s bound (S = 2
√
2) and the lower bound for violations
of Bell’s inequality (S = 2). Purified Bell pairs violate the bound at about F = 0.7.
Non-purified Bell pairs violate the bound at about F = 0.78.
entire capacity of the network is spent to execute these operations, so that quantum
communications for users are not yet provided. Based on the information acquired via
this tomography, the network nodes create routing tables for selecting paths through
the network.
Phase 2. Normal operation. In normal operations, the network performs quantum
communications for end node applications and various tomography operations for the
maintenance of the network. The network slack prevents instability of connections and
requires us to minimize possible maintenance costs. This phase is the main portion of
network operations and continues until the detection of repeater hijacking. Dynamic
changes to traffic and topology occur, but for our purposes here are treated as static.
Phase 3. After repeater hijacking detection. The amount of useful work lost depends
on our lag in detecting the start of hijacking, which in turn depends on the frequency
of tomography. The network performs rerouting operations and isolates all suspected
repeaters.
Reduced network performance and increased communication costs shrink the slack.
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Phase 4. Return of innocent repeaters By careful verification, if the administrator
identifies the actual hijacked repeater, he returns all isolated innocent repeaters to the
network. After these operations, the network is reset to a new steady-state equilibrium,
giving us a new Phase 2.
3. The impact of repeater hijacking
3.1. The Hijacker’s Capabilities
For our model of a hijacker, we assume that the hijacker has taken complete classical
control of a quantum repeater, but is not capable of new physical actions such as
blinding detectors [49]. We are focusing on the hijacker’s selective use of the repeater’s
quantum capabilities, such as modifying the circuits used for purification, quantum error
correction or entanglement swapping. The hijacker may alter destinations of operations,
rerouting connections or entangling additional qubits to quantum states that are being
developed. Those qubits may be local within the hijacked repeater, or may involve a
fourth party elsewhere in the network. Accordingly, the hijacker is able to foil quantum
communications and potentially to steal quantum information.
Hijacking of an End node would give the hijacker the ability to convince an
application of any behavior by the network, just as taking control of a personal
computer’s operating system allows a hacker to emulate any behavior by the system.
This means the hijacker can conceal hijacking all the way to the end of the application’s
work. Such an all-powerful hijacker is beyond the scope of this work.
In this paper, we focus on the detectable hijacking of Routers and Repeaters.
The hijacker’s goal is to maximize the hijacking time and the range of influence while
remaining undetected.
In following parts of this section, we define the work of a network, classify two types
of effects of repeater hijacking, and quantify the work loss problem.
3.2. Defining connection cost
To quantify the network impact of the hijacking of a quantum router, we need to
understand the amount of work (see the work entry in Table 1) done by the network. We
can either count connections and sum the work done per connection across the entire
network, or we can count nodes and sum the work done per node across the entire
network. As our goal is to study the hijacking of a single router, the latter may seem
more desirable, but the behavior of ES connections makes the former easier in some
ways.
First, let us establish a definition of work. The primary element of work in a
quantum network is the quantum optical pulses used to create entanglement across a
link. The work done for a connection, then, is the total number of pulses used on behalf
of that connection across the set of nodes involved [38].
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For one connection achieving an end-to-end Bell pair generation rate (data rate) of
D Bell pairs/second consumed by the application such as QKD or quantum distributed
computation, how much work is done? The work done at each node is D multiplied by
an overhead factor H that depends on the type of repeater network:
ES type repeater: HESk,i = O((hk,i)
c), (2)
QEC type repeater: HQECk,i = O(d), (3)
where hk,i denotes the path length for connection i passing through the repeater k, and
c is a small constant dependent on the details of the purification scheme. d denotes
the code distance or the block size for error correction. (For comparison, because the
error correction overhead is essentially constant, the amount of work done at a node in a
classical network is simply linear in the number of bits being transmitted, HCk,i = O(1).)
To calculate the work at repeater k, we simply sum over the HD product for each
connection passing through the repeater,
Wk =
∑
i∈connections
H typek,i Dk,i. (4)
Note that this sum is only the work contributing directly to end-to-end states to be
consumed by application, and does not include the cost of tomography. Then, we can
quantify the work of network W as follows:
W =
∑
k∈nodes
Wk =
∑
k
∑
i∈connections
H typek,i Dk,i. (5)
3.3. Quantifying work loss
When we detect the hijacking of repeater k with duration t, we can consider all
connections using k to be lost. The amount of work loss Lk is more than Wk, with
other repeaters work corresponds to lost connections as follows:
Lkt =
∑
i∈connections
(hk,i + 1)H
type
k,i Dk,it. (6)
4. Preventing repeater hijacking
4.1. Distributed style tomography for hijacking detection
Tomography is a conventional scheme for characterizing a quantum state [36], and can be
repurposed to detect quantum state falsification. This scheme can be applied to verifying
the link state and the repeater state, including the detection of repeater hijacking. For
example, the hijacker entangles a third qubit C with the Bell pair |Φ+〉AB Alice and Bob
are sharing. The system ρABC without C becomes a completely mixed state as follows:
ρABC = (|000〉+ |111〉)⊗ (〈000|+ 〈111|), (7)
ρAB ≡ TrC(ρAB) (8)
= |00〉〈00|AB + |11〉〈11|AB. (9)
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Then, an ensemble of ρAB cannot prove a Bell inequality violation and hijacking can
be detected statistically over a set of trials. Of course, this works only if both sides
share measurement results securely. If the eavesdropper can modify or control both
the quantum and classical connections between the two parties, she can send false
measurement results and fake a Bell inquality violation [5, 50, 51]. To avoid such a
man in the middle attack, we assume all classical communications are authenticated
and unmodified. Then, each node can send classical messages to other nodes securely.
4.2. Work for tomography
Next, we discuss the work for a node and any type of link tomography.
Node tomography (self check) State tomography and process tomography in each
node are requisite for verification of gate operation and internal self functions. This
tomography cannot detect repeater hijacking. In this research, we assume this operation
is done periodically.
1 hop link tomography Periodic but frequent tomography between nearest neighbor
repeaters is requisite for verification of the state of each link. In prior work [40], we
have shown that we need around 2000 ∼ 3000 Bell pairs for tomography to reconstruct
the state with 99% fidelity for initial Bell pair fidelity of F ' 0.65. We can define the
tomography work for link j as follows:
M linkj = B(F )E(F ), (10)
where B(F ) denotes required number of Bell pair for tomography based on initial Bell
pair fidelity F and E(F ) is as in Eq. (A.6).
Multilevel recursive tomography for ES model In ES model repeater networks,
multilevel recursive tomography is requisite for checking the condition of purification,
entanglement swapping operations and the connection state. The tomography work at
ES model repeater k for connection i becomes as follows:
M
con(ES)
k,i = B(F )E(F )B(F
′′)E(F ′′)B(F ′′′′)E(F ′′′′)· · ·B(F ′···′)E(F ′···′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
log(hk,i)
.(11)
We can calculate F
′···′ using Eq. (A.5) recursively.
End to End tomography for QEC model During quantum communications on QEC
model repeaters, both end nodes need to execute tomography periodically to check the
connection state. If done with appropriate attention to security, this operation can
detect the repeater hijacking, but cannot identify which repeater has been hijacked if
the connection length is larger than 2 hops. The tomography work at QEC model
repeater for connection i becomes as follows:
M
con(QEC)
k,i = hk,iB(F )E(F ). (12)
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We will discuss the frequency and the total work of those tomography in following
section.
4.3. Identification of hijacking repeater
When the hijacked repeater always acts maliciously on every connection, the
administrator can identify that repeater by using the combination of reported
tomography results. In contrast, when the hijacked repeater targets only the connection
between two specific repeaters, whether administrator can identify or not depends on
the repeater models.
For example, in Fig. 2, if it is known that the a−a′ and b−b′ connections both pass
through a hijacked repeater, we can infer that the malicious node is k. Naturally, this
identification process requires substantial support from the classical network protocols.
4.3.1. ES model In the ES model, repeaters perform entanglement swapping in a
nested tree to share final Bell pairs for communication. As shown in Fig. 6, if we
perform cryptographically secure tomography along with every entanglement swapping
operation, we can finger the culprit repeater. After the identification, the network
P P
F
F
P P
F
P
Hijacked Hijacked
Case 1. Case 2.
Figure 6. Arrows denote entanglement swapping operation by the repeater below. P
and F denote tomography results whether pass or fail. By process of elimination, we
can identify the hijacked repeater.
should isolate the hijacked repeater as soon as possible and reroute connections passing
through that repeater. These changes reduce total network performance and increase
communication costs so that the slack of network is suppressed. In exchange for this
burden, the effects of the hijacking are rooted out.
4.3.2. QEC model In the QEC model, we can detect the repeater hijacking using end to
end tomography but our ability to correctly identify the hijacked repeater is weak. When
the hijacked repeater targets specific one connection through multiple repeaters, we
cannot identify the hijacked repeater. Then we must reroute the connection and should
temporarily increase the frequency of tomography to determine if we have successfully
rerouted around the hijacked repeater. As shown in Fig. 7, if the attack continues,
identification of hijacked repeater may be possible. However, in the example in Case 2.
with no ability to route around the hijacked node, the connection may have to be
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Hijacked
Rerouted connection
Original connection
Case 1.
Hijacked
Original connection
Case 2.
Rerouted connection
Figure 7. The information from hijacking detection process narrows down the
candidates. The rapid sharing of this information across the entire network is
important.
abandoned. The aftermath of the identification and effects associated with it are similar
to the ES model.
4.4. The appropriate frequency of tomography.
To maintain the integrity of a repeater network, we need periodic tomography on each
link and node. Here, we discuss the appropriate frequency of tomography.
To provide load balancing, sliding window is a suitable scheme for link tomography.
Each link performs burst size tomography operations with average interval m. Here,
each interval must vary randomly to foil attempts by the hijacker to remain undetected
by laying low and not intercepting states to be used for tomography. The network can
verify the link states using the tomography results of the prescribed window, as shown
in Fig. 8. There is the following relation between the time for verification T and the
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Figure 8. In normal network operation (Phase 2), we perform the burst size of
tomography to each link with average interval m. We can verify the state of link using
constant number of sequential tomography results. In this figure, the window size is 3.
window size for tomography w:
T = wm. (13)
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The total tomography cost for network maintenance per second R can be described as
follows:
R =
∑
j∈links
M linkj
wm
+
∑
k∈nodes
M conk
w′m′
, (14)
where w (w′) and m (m′) denote the window size and interval of link (connection)
tomography. For example, if each burst is 10 Bell pairs with the interval m = 1 sec and
2000 Bell pairs are required for tomography, we need 200 seconds for link verification.
5. Framing innocent repeaters
5.1. Framing an innocent repeater
If the hijacker continues attacking in the most straightforward fashion, we can identify
the hijacked repeater or prevent attacking as just described. However, if the hijacker can
identify Bell pairs that will be used for hijack detection in any layer above his position in
the swapping hierarchy or any connection he terminates, he can substantially damage
operation of large swaths of the network by framing innocent repeaters, convincing
network administrators that other repeaters besides itself have been hijacked.
The hijacker can frame another, innocent repeater in one of two ways: first, when
it is the endpoint of a Bell pair, it can directly falsify measurement results, causing the
failure of the entanglement checks that test for the presence of a hijacker, in which case
the last node to perform entanglement swapping will be blamed. Second, if it knows
the sequence of tests performed by the other nodes after entanglement swapping, it can
selectively choose which Bell pairs to corrupt.
For example, in the left side of Fig. 9, the hijacked router’s neighbors a and b will
check the Bell pairs created after the hijacker’s entanglement swap. If they detect
corruption, they will naturally blame the hijacker and report him to the network
adminstrator. If, however, the hijacker allows the a − b Bell pairs to be created
Figure 9. In a path of repeaters in an ES network, the hijacker can frame repeaters
a and b in several ways. In QEC a network, the hijacker can frame by attacking a
specific connection.
uncorrupted but corrupts the Bell pairs used for the a−c check (marked 1 in the figure),
the a − b check will pass but the a − c check will fail, and nodes a and c will instead
conclude that b has been hijacked. The hijacker has successfully framed b, who will
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now be reported to the network administrator and removed from the network, pending
further investigation.
This level of subterfuge is possible if the hijacker can predict which Bell pairs will
be used for which operations. For example, if the first ten Bell pairs created with a are
used to check the link, the next ten to check the a− b connection, and the next ten used
to check the a − c connection, the hijacker knows to leave the first twenty Bell pairs
alone, then corrupt the next ten.
In a QEC network, checks are not done in the same nested fashion, so a hijacker
cannot use this technique to frame other repeaters. However, because end-to-end checks
are done, he can still disrupt any individual connection. which then forces rerouting
of that connection, as described in Sec. 4.3.2. QEC network administrators will use
these end-to-end reports to attempt to identify and isolate the hijacker, as described
in Sec. 2.3. In the right half of Fig. 9, the hijacker is carrying two connections. If he
chooses to corrupt the e− e′ connection but not the d− d′ connection, an administrator
examining the network will logically conclude that the bad guy is router f , and the
hijacker has successfully framed someone other than himself.
5.2. Possibility of bringing down the network
When the attack is detected, the network administrator will isolate suspect repeaters
from the network. Depending on the structure of the network, framing several carefully
chosen repeaters can bring down the network. We show examples of bringing down the
network in Fig. 10. To prevent such a serious situation, the network topology should be
Figure 10. Examples of bringing down the networks by framing. In the left case,
framing of repeaters c and d by hijacked repeater e prevents the communications
between a− a′ and b− b′. This example shows that the exact framing can bring down
a network of a particular topology. In the right case, the hijacked repeater severs
the network surrounded by a circle using framing to several outline repeaters (dashed
circles) from the entire network. After framing the seven repeaters, the network will
be partitioned, and nodes inside the circle will be unable to communicate with those
outside the circle.
designed robustly.
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5.3. Preventing framing
Use of a simple or easily predicted sequence of Bell pairs for hijack detection allows a
hijacker to hide his presence and to frame other nodes. This can result in something of
a cat and mouse game if the hijacker lays low during the investigation. To prevent this,
administrators need to conceal information about the sequence of hijack detection. For
a given connection the choice of which Bell pairs will be used for hijack detection can
be decided by the end nodes using some form of secret agreement, or the sequence can
be chosen by an administrator and communicated securely to the set of nodes in the
path. The interval between Bell pairs chosen for hijack detection, at each level of the
check (number of hops spanned by the Bell pairs), must appear random to any outside
observer. For example, in the left hand side of Fig. 7, node b naturally must know
which Bell pairs shared with a will be used to check for hijacking between them, but it
must not be able to predict which Bell pairs will be used to check for hijacking between
a and c. (both those directly reported by an end node and those that can otherwise be
reasoned to be suspects)
As one of the draft, administrator every give the sequence information to repeaters
which practice just before execution. The execute period should be to appear in
randomly.
Administrator also consider the framing and perform isolation to all suspect
repeaters (reported and all reportable repeaters). At the same time as isolation, the
administrator should check isolated repeaters directly to close in on and confirm the
identity of the hijacked repeater. After this quarantine, repeaters shown to be innocent
will be gradually returned to the network. We will discuss the transition of network
performance during these operation in next section.
6. Post process of hijacking detection
6.1. An increase of the work from rerouting penalty
When the network detects the hijacking of repeater k, k and other suspected repeaters
are isolated from other repeaters and all connections via suspect repeaters are forced
to reroute. If all connections selected the shortest path, rerouting increases each path
length by ∆sus,i, where i denotes connection i passing through suspected repeaters.
The increased work W ′ in contrast with W in Eq. (5) can be described as follows:
W ′ = W − Lsus +
∑
i∈rerouted−connections
(hsus,i + 1 + ∆sus,i)H
′type
sus,iD
′
sus,i, (15)
where Lsus, H
′type
sus,i and D
′
sus,i are work loss from isolation of suspected repeaters, the
updated work and datarate for each rerouted connection not passing through suspected
repeaters.
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6.2. The occurrence of Work shedding
We next investigate the phase of network operations from the point view of the change
of change in the network slack.
Phase 1. Network bootstrapping During this phase, all network performance is spent
on node and link tomography. Normal quantum communication has not started yet.
The slack of the network will be narrow in this phase.
Phase 2. Normal operation In the normal operation phase, the network requires
node and link tomography within the interval m. Quantum communications subject
to additional multilevel recursive tomography cost M con (in ES repeater cases; QEC
network requires end to end tomography) corresponding to communication work. Then,
the network slack S becomes as follows:
S = C −W −R. (16)
Here we assume W = 0.7C, R = 0.1C and S = 0.2C. Using the quantitative assumption
after Eq. (14), this network is still provides 20 Bell pairs per second as surplus capacity.
We assume the repeater hijacking event occurs at a certain point in time in this
phase. For efficient operation, the maintenance cost should be sufficiently smaller than
the worst assumption of the work loss Lworstsus as follows:
R Lsus. (17)
Here, “the maximum time from the start to detection of repeater hijacking” is equal
to the time for verification T . Using Eq. (13), we can consider both the maintenance
state analysis cost M and Lsus to be functions of m. To satisfy this requirement, we
should not adopt an excessively small m. A larger m suppresses the maintenance cost
but increases the impact of repeater hijacking.
Phase 3. After repeater hijacking detection After repeater hijacking detection, the
troubled repeater is purged from the network and connections through that repeater
are rerouted. As the rerouting progresses, the amount of work lost at a given moment is
gradually reduced and the costs of rerouted connections increase, as above. Then, the
slack of the network becomes as follows:
S ′ = (C − Csus)−W ′ − (R−Rsus), (18)
where the subscript sus denotes all suspected repeaters including the hijacked repeater
k and Rsus denotes the maintenance costs for sus and links to sus. As S declines,
queueing delays go up. If S becomes zero or negative, we have insufficient capacity to
support our current work, and must shed some work. The available network bandwidth
goes down and we cannot avoid communication delay.
As an example, assume the extreme case in which 10% repeaters of network are
suspected of having been. Then, we can set Csus = 0.1C and Rsus = 0.1R. Using the
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assumption after Eq. (16), in order to keep the slack value positive, we need to keep
W ′ < 0.81C. In other words, the increase in communication cost W ′−W accompanying
the route change has to stay less than 0.11C = 11 Bell pairs per sec. As in the above
discussion, the slack of the network depends on interval parameters of tomography and
the rerouting penalty.
Phase 4. Return of innocent repeaters By careful verification, if the administrator
believes she has reliably identified the really hijacked repeater k, isolated innocent
repeaters are returned to the network. Then, the recoverd slack S ′′ and reconfigured
work of the network W ′′ becomes as follows:
S ′′ = (C − Ck)−W ′′ − (R−Rk), (19)
W ′′ = W − Lk,i +
∑
i∈connections
(hk,i + 1 + ∆k,i)H
′type
k,i D
′
k,i. (20)
Since W ′′ is obviously smaller than W ′, in some cases, we can expect that the workload
shedding will be solved by returning the slack to a positive value.
7. Discussion
In this paper, we show the effects of repeater hijacking and appropriate network
operations from the viewpoint of the slack on ES and QEC model quantum repeater
networks. To make quantitative discussions, we quantify works of repeater network
based on the required number of pulses for distributed quantum tomography. We present
actual phases of quantum repeater network operation and expected maximum duration
of repeater hijacking. To suppress work losses, we need larger maintenance costs and
network slack is tight. For this reason, we recommend that the interval may be adjusted
carefully to prevent the possibility of work shedding and the bringing of huge work losses
for the actual network design. We also show the difference between ES and QEC model
in identification of hijacking repeater. In the QEC model, we can detect hijacking but
cannot always identify the hijacking repeater.
A single hijacked node can, in theory, bring down an entire network by leveraging
two factors to frame other repeaters: the necessity of many distributed checks in the
network to support effective operation, and the delayed dependence of the results of
those checks on prior operations. Classical networks of course are vulnerable to various
attacks on their routing algorithms that can make portions of the network unreachable,
but no checks equivalent to post-entanglement swapping tomography are conducted,
so no similar subversion mechanism is possible. Fortunately, the relatively simple fix
of choosing Bell pairs for hijack checks in a random, secure manner can alleviate this
vulnerability.
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Appendix A. Purification and CHSH values
We adopt the following Werner state ρ as given initial noisy Bell pairs
ρ = F |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ 1− F
3
(|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|) . (A.1)
Using purification protocol between two Bell pairs [47, 48], we first suppress X errors
on one Bell pair (which we call subject) while consuming tool Bell pairs. The
correspondence output states, subject and tool Bell pairs is as follows:
Source \Target Φ+ Ψ+ Ψ− Φ−
Φ+ Φ+ × × Φ−
Ψ+ × Ψ+ Ψ− ×
Ψ− × Ψ− Ψ+ ×
Φ− Φ− × × Φ+
where × denotes an outcome discarded as failure. The success probability of this round
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of purification P1 becomes
P1 =
(
F +
1− F
3
)2
+
(
2(1− F )
3
)2
. (A.2)
Therefore, the fidelity of once-purified state F ′ becomes
F ′ =
1
P1
(
F 2 +
(
1− F
3
)2)
. (A.3)
We next perform purification protocol to suppress Z errors then use two once-
purified Bell pairs as resources. The correspondence of output states, subject and tool
Bell pairs is as follows:
Source \Target Φ+ Ψ+ Ψ− Φ−
Φ+ Φ+ Ψ+ × ×
Ψ+ Ψ+ Φ+ × ×
Ψ− × × Φ− Ψ−
Φ− × × Ψ− Φ−
The success probability of this round P1 becomes
P2 =
(
F ′ +
2(1− F )2
9P1
)2
+
(
2(1− F )(1 + 2F )
9P1
)2
. (A.4)
The fidelity of twice-purified state F ′′ and the expected required number of initial Bell
pairs E(F ) becomes
F ′′ =
1
P2
(
F ′2 +
(
2(1− F )2
9P1
)2)
, (A.5)
E(F ) =
4
P 21P2
. (A.6)
To calculate the CHSH measure of Bell pairs, we also adopt the following usual
form of CHSH inequality [52]:
|S| ≤ 2, (A.7)
where
S = E(θ, φ) + E(θ, φ′) + E(θ′, φ) + E(θ′, φ′). (A.8)
θ, θ′, φ, and φ′ denote the particular choices of measurement angle of each qubit. We
adopt Bloch sphere angles of 0, pi
2
, pi
4
, and 3pi
4
respectively.
